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For the past 20 years, public health has become a central 
feature of Brazilian international relations and foreign 
diplomacy, particularly under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s 
(2003-2010) administration1. During such period, the 
emphasis on humanitarian matters, social inclusion, jus-
tice, and antipoverty, when combined with commitment 
to multilateralism in the international sphere, motivated 
his administration’s approach to the Brazilian Foreign Pol-
icy (henceforth, BFP) in health (Cervo, 2010; Hermann, 
2011; Leite, 2011; Ventura, 2013). BFP in health played an 
important – and widely acclaimed – role in Brazil’s South-
South cooperation, alongside agriculture and education 
(Hirst, 2012, p. 11). In the course of time, Lula’s interna-
tional activities drew considerable international attention 
and praise; and health was considered a topic that could 
increase the Brazilian participation in international rela-
tions (Ventura, 2013).
1  This article further debates the work introduced by Ventura and Perez 
(2015).
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During Lula’s term, the country showed the protago-
nism of the BPF efforts by supporting regional agendas, 
which emphasized health in the scope of the Community 
of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) and the Union 
of South American Countries (USAN, Unión de Naciones 
Suramericanas – Unasur) – a regional organization com-
prised of a Health Council and an Institute of Government 
in Health –, as well as other important international policy 
initiatives (Buss and Ferreira, 2011; Ventura, 2013).
In this article, we question the extent to which the BFP 
in health continued during President Dilma Rousseff’s first 
term administration (2011-2014). In contrast to what was 
seen under Lula’s government, the BFP in health in the 
2011-2014 period has faced a decline in its financial, orga-
nizational, and international assistance endeavors. While 
some scholars have recently characterized Lula’s BFP efforts 
as “autonomy by diversification” or “reciprocal multilater-
alism” (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2007; Cervo, 2010), oth-
ers have described Dilma’s administration as a “systemic 
decline”, with a corresponding lack of commitment to sus-
taining Lula’s BFP efforts (Cervo and Lessa, 2014).
We attribute these outcomes to the following factors: 
firstly, there was a decline in the presidential and congres-
sional budgetary support for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA); secondly, Dilma’s inward focus and commitment to 
national economic and social welfare development, which, 
in turn, has created a lack of interest in BFP and has discov-
ered its association with national development. This change 
of focus has also resulted in an increased separation between 
the Executive Office of the President and the MOFA, with 
a corresponding decrease in diplomatic motivation and 
commitment to the BFP in health. Thirdly, the lack of inter-
est during Dilma’s administration in BFP has created little 
involvement in unifying the state and civil society (including 
private sector actors) to work together at international level.
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Methodology
A single case-study research was conducted and found 
empirical data from several sources. Brazil was selected 
because the authors focused on understanding Brazil’s evo-
lutionary change in the BFP in health.
With respect to qualitative data for this study, firstly, 
the authors randomly distributed survey questionnaires by 
email to several Brazilian diplomats working within the cur-
rent Dilma’s administration, in diplomatic posts in Brazil 
and abroad. The questions were emailed on February 2016 
with an Informed Consent Form, and ten surveys were 
answered after a month. The questionnaires had four open-
-ended questions2 and the answers were emailed as well. 
The results were used to support assertions made about the 
three aforementioned factors, contributing to a downward 
shift in the BFP in health. Secondly, the theoretical liter-
ature and empirical case study examples discussed in this 
study drew from several primary and secondary peer-revised 
scholarly articles and policy reports. Finally, empirical bud-
getary data illustrating congressional commitments to the 
BFP in health were obtained by revising the Brazilian Offi-
cial Federal Budget.
In this paper, foreign policy is understood as a public pol-
icy, therefore defined as the state and government in action 
at international level (Pinheiro and Milani, 2012). Only pre-
existing programs or projects being negotiated during Lula’s 
administration were considered for this analysis.
2  The questions were: (1) Was there an abrupt change in the BFP during Dilma 
Rousseff’s first term (2011-2014) when compared to Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s era 
(2003-2010)? If so, what are the reasons for this change in your opinion? If not, 
what continued to be the same, in your opinion?; (2) Do you believe that Dilma’s 
foreign policy has got a main idea/concept for the BFP in the considered period 
of time?; (3) Cervo and Lessa (2014) use the word “decline” as a descriptor of the 
BFP under Dilma’s era. Would this word be the best one to describe the changes 
that took place during Dilma’s first term?; (4) Are there differences in working 
with Itamaraty between Lula’s and Dilma’s era that can be highlighted?.
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Foreign policy in health rise and changes 
In recent years, a considerable amount of scholarly lit-
erature has been aimed on the reasons for, and the strate-
gies behind, government’s interest in and commitment to 
bilateral and multilateral foreign policy in health. Analyses 
of this interest and commitment are recent in the global 
health diplomacy literature, and this work focused on the 
various political, civil society, and normative commitments 
behind governments interested in providing funding and 
technical assistance to other nations in the area of health-
care (Michaud and Kates, 2013; Novotny, Kickbusch and 
Told, 2013; Kickbusch et al., 2013; Lee and Smith, 2011; 
Labonte and Gagnon, 2010). Two major schools of thought 
dominated the literature’s discussion on the rationale and 
on the evolution of this kind of foreign aid.
One school of thought emphasizes the soft-power strate-
gies behind a government’s provision of foreign aid in health. 
This is developed based on Joseph Nye’s discussion about 
soft power (Nye, 2004), which focuses on state strategies to 
increase its international political influence through the dem-
onstration of success in the domestic policy as well as culture, 
in turn persuading other states that their policy approach 
to particular issues is more effective – in a sense, “leading 
through example”. Soft-power strategies in health have aimed 
on the state’s interest and ability to influence international dis-
course and policy actions showing domestic success in health 
policy and outcomes, as well as a successful compliance with 
international normative commitments in health. According 
to such literature, states engage in providing foreign aid in 
health to bolster their ability to shape the international poli-
cy agenda in health, persuading other nations that, based on 
their success at the domestic level, their particular approach 
to public health is effective and should be emulated by other 
nations (Lee and Gómez, 2011; Thompson, 2005). Some peo-
ple claim this reveals a government’s successful and emerging 
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power status (Twigg, 2012; Bliss, 2011; Lee and Gómez, 2011; 
Thompson, 2005). In addition to foreign aid in health, these 
states also bolster their international policy and political influ-
ence by proactively engaging in diplomatic exercises and mar-
keting strategies. These would reveal their success in tackling 
pressing healthcare challenges and inequalities within their 
borders (Gómez, 2012; Lee and Gómez, 2011), and in turn 
establish themselves as experienced and well-capable states 
that are committed to eradicating a disease. Such act provides 
legitimacy and influence when seeking to shape international 
health policy discussions. These states often achieve this pro-
cess by using international institutional forums, such as confer-
ences and task force meetings within multilateral governing 
bodies, like the United Nations (UN) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO), to discuss their success in meeting 
healthcare needs, achieving humanitarian objectives and sav-
ing lives (Watt, Gómez and McKee, 2013).
Nations may also have international reputational con-
cerns and aspirations for providing foreign aid in health. 
Often, interest in international reputation building and 
rejuvenating a state’s image in the international sphere 
motivates government officials to provide assistance (Chan, 
Chen and Xu, 2010; Huang, 2010). This occurs when states 
have acquired a reputation as a hostile state towards other 
nations, either through unfavorable trade relations, nation-
al security threats, or military action. The goal in this sce-
nario is to use bilateral and/or multilateral assistance to 
rejuvenate the government’s international reputation as a 
peaceful and benevolent state (Michaud and Kates, 2012; 
Feldman and Michaud, 2010). As Feldman and Michaud 
(2010) maintain, for example, shortly after the invasion of 
the United States to Iraq in 2003, to rejuvenate the reputa-
tion of Bush’s administration as a benevolent, caring actor, 
the US Navy was delegated the task of providing medical 
assistance to local Iraqi communities.
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Finally, others claim that states engage in foreign aid in 
health and increase their international assistance over time 
in order to gain access to foreign markets. A work by Huang 
(2011), for example, shows how China’s efforts to provide 
bilateral aid to several African nations was a strategic way to 
enter domestic African markets. Huang (2011) found that 
China’s export of pharmaceutical drugs, though appearing 
as an altruistic move on the surface, eventually revealed the 
country’s intention of importing its cheaper drug products 
into Africa and establishing a market for China’s pharma-
ceutical medicine. Moreover, it was subsequently revealed 
that the quality of medicine and treatment provided for 
China’s medical assistance to selected African communities 
was low, suggesting that the main motive was to establish 
friends and gain access to markets, not necessarily benev-
olent (Huang, 2011). Similar medical aid in exchange for 
economic and natural resources, such as access to cheaper 
barrels of oil, was found in Cuba’s medical primary health-
care work in Venezuela (Werlau, 2013). One could extend 
this to argue that Cuba’s recent presence in Brazil has partly 
been motivated by the Cuban state’s efforts to earn mon-
ey through our country’s payment for medical assistance 
(Cowley, 2014).
While the global health diplomacy literature has cer-
tainly contributed to our understanding of the reasons why 
foreign aid in health is provided, it does not speak to the rea-
sons why governments gradually change their foreign policy 
strategies in health. Why, for instance, do presidents and 
governing political parties suddenly change their views 
and interest in providing foreign aid in health, leading to 
either a decline or a complete cessation in such assistance? 
Also puzzling is when this shift in foreign policy focus 
occurs on similar types of governing political parties, or the 
same one, that has been committed to providing foreign aid 
in health as a normative and ethical extension of their pre-
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existing domestic commitment to poverty eradication and 
universal healthcare provision. In this political context, we 
should expect that governing political parties providing for-
eign aid in health, guided by these normative beliefs, might 
not try to dramatically change their foreign assistance strat-
egies. For this could be viewed as a breach of commitment 
to preexisting political party tenants, could threaten domes-
tic electoral support, and even the government’s broader 
credibility at international level.
The case of Brazil in this article nevertheless builds on 
the existing global health diplomacy literature by showing 
that governing political parties and presidents may even-
tually decide to decrease their foreign policy activities in 
health. Moreover, this may occur even when incumbent 
presidents and political parties adhere to normative ten-
ants adopted by previous administrations, safeguarded by 
their governing political party. We argue this occurs when 
there is a decrease in federal budgetary support for federal 
agencies, a corresponding change in the financial manage-
rial autonomy and control, as well as the president’s inward 
focus on national development in lieu of foreign policy in 
health – or in general.
Possible reasons for Dilma Rousseff’s different approach 
to the Brazilian Foreign Policy
In Brazil, the government’s provision of healthcare assis-
tance, by way of policy and technical assistance, reflects one 
small, yet historically large, aspect of its foreign policy activi-
ties. During the investigation period, that is, Dilma’s first 
term in office (2011-2014), the government’s change on the 
BFP in health reflected a broader shift in the government’s 
foreign policy activities.
To understand Dilma’s administration change in the 
BFP strategies in health, the authors sent a questionnaire 
to diplomats, aiming at discovering reasons and motiva-
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tions for the decline of Dilma’s administration on the BFP 
in health, an outcome that was corroborated by the recent 
work of Cervo and Lessa (2014).
According to our survey’s participants, the first reason 
accounting for why BFP in health has declined during Dilma’s 
term has to do with her lack of personal interest in inter-
national affairs, choosing instead to focus on national 
development. Dilma and her close advisors have not been 
as interested in foreign policy matters as Lula’s adminis-
tration. This is mainly due to the fact that Dilma has been 
more concerned with national economic and social devel-
opment, and therefore has an inward, rather than global, 
focus. Therefore, she has been unable to understand the 
role of foreign policy as a capable tool to boost domestic 
social and economic development.
The use of foreign policy as a mechanism for national 
development is a long-existing tradition in the BFP, and in 
the 20th century, domestic development became a funda-
mental issue to Brazilian foreign affairs (Lafer, 2000). None-
theless, President Dilma does not believe that diplomacy is 
able to turn international contexts into national opportu-
nities for growth. This is surprising given the fact that she 
hails from the same political party as former President Lula, 
that is, the Workers’ Party (PT, acronym in Portuguese). 
Because of this, she has essentially adopted the same ideo-
logical principles and moral components of Lula and the 
PT, as ending poverty and a commitment to end hunger.
According to diplomats in our survey, the second rea-
son for the decline in the BFP during Dilma’s term was 
the budget cuts faced by the MOFA. The main ideas and 
principles of the foreign policy remain, as well as the gen-
eral goals. For instance, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, Chi-
na and South Africa) partnerships and good relationships 
with South American nations are still crucial to Brazil. What 
has nevertheless changed in recent years are the financial 
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resources available for these activities, and the management 
of such resources.
The interviewed subjects indicted that such decline in 
federal funding has affected Brazilian diplomacy in a very 
specific way: foreign affairs diplomats are no longer able to 
travel for meetings or negotiations abroad. To save money, 
the MOFA, aka Itamaraty, has been sending diplomatic offi-
cials within countries to specific negotiations, rather than 
sending diplomats from Brazil that know the issues better 
and are therefore better equipped to engage in negotiations; 
this, in turn, has hindered the government’s international 
reputation in diplomatic relations. The participation of expe-
rienced and knowledgeable diplomats is important because 
they are responsible for increasing and positively influencing 
Brazil’s participation in politics debates and decisions.
Cooperation projects were greatly impacted too, since 
the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (BCA) has lost a great 
deal of its budget. Consequently, Dilma’s administration 
was unable to commit to new international cooperation 
projects. Hence, the participants noted that the BCA has 
tried to explore ways for engaging in different tasks without 
acquiring and earmarking more funding.
In addition to a decline in funding, during Dilma’s 
first term in office, Itamaraty partially lost its autonomy in 
the budgetary management. The government’s contribu-
tions to international organizations, such as the CPLP, now 
falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of Planning, 
Budget, and Management. This loss of financial autonomy 
and overall reduction in the budgetary support has greatly 
impacted Itamaraty’s daily operations. Even activities that 
did not suffer presidential interference, such as the consul-
ar services, were affected.
Thus, with a decrease of Itamaraty’s funding and a lack 
of presidential support and attention, Itamaraty’s diplomats 
have not been motivated to conduct their work. Based on 
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our survey respondents, such professionals may not under-
stand the point of spending hours negotiating Brazil’s inter-
ests in international forums if the president and other gov-
ernment officials will not value their efforts.
As a further consequence to this situation, the survey 
respondents maintain that there has been a sense of “sepa-
ration” between Dilma’s administration and Itamaraty. The 
president and her advisors do not understand the impor-
tance of Itamaraty’s work and how it affects national devel-
opment. At the same time, due to this indifference and 
apathy of Dilma’s administration towards them, Itamaraty 
diplomats are unable to understand what she wants and 
expects from them and how to demonstrate their relevance 
and importance to the country.
These findings support scholars, emphasizing the impor-
tance of presidential leadership in foreign policy. For exam-
ple, Hudson (2014) claims there are many variables that 
must be taken into consideration when analyzing the influ-
ence of a country’s leader in foreign policy, such as the type 
of political regime, whether or not the leader is interest-
ed in foreign policy, the domestic situation, and the ability 
of leaders’ advisors to read different contexts. Brazil has a 
strong presidential system, although fragmentation of par-
ties and need of forming coalitions impact on presidential 
rule (Mainwaring, 1997; Figueiredo and Limongi, 2000). 
During Dilma’s first term, as mentioned, the economic situ-
ation was still fairly stable. With a whole office that is not 
deeply concerned with international affairs and a leader 
that does not recognize the BFP’s potential role, Itamaraty 
was relegated to a distant relationship.
Finally, yet another reason for the decline in BFP under 
Dilma’s term is related to her administration’s inability 
of establishing a clear set of ideas for foreign diplomatic 
engagement. Based on the respondents to our question-
naires, who built their opinion on a previous point empha-
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sized by Cervo and Lessa (2014), Dilma’s administration 
has no clear idea on how they could bring the government 
and civil society together to work on foreign policy. Some 
diplomatic officials suggested that there essentially was no 
foreign policy agenda under Dilma’s term: she has no long-
-term perspective or vision for the country in the area of 
foreign policy. Rather, Dilma tends to value short-term, fea-
sible, and visibly concrete results. International diplomacy, 
however, does not provide these kinds of short-term gains 
and expectations and is more likely to produce more subtle 
outcomes. In this situation, the nonexistence of a foreign 
policy agenda is problematic. In the best scenario, Brazil 
would neither advance nor come up with new projects 
nor would it retreat. However, this immobility is leading the 
country to lose opportunities to new foreign policy ideas 
and/or those positions Brazil had already acquired.
The last idea from the questionnaires was the percep-
tion that Itamaraty had problems of its own. The MOFA also 
showed difficulties recognizing what Dilma wanted from it, 
which could be a consequence of choice taken by the Minis-
ters of Foreign Affairs in the period. They both suffered from 
a lack of political ability to deal with the demands of the Espla-
nade of Ministries. The First Minister, during Dilma’s first 
administration, Antônio Patriota (2011-2013), was a brilliant 
diplomat with no skills to deal with the Brazilian congress. Luiz 
Alberto Figueiredo (2013-2015) was the second Minister when 
Itamaraty lost its course of action. None of them was able to 
develop the same relationship with political representatives as 
Amorim, a minister considered a clever interlocutor who has a 
close bond with former president Lula.
Furthermore, in recent years, Brazil has become more 
reactive than proactive in its diplomatic activities. Snowden’s 
scandal, as well as the impeachment of President Fernando 
Lugo in Paraguay and the Rio+20 Conference, essentially 
forced Brazil, as a regional leader, to react. Dilma is more 
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likely to pay attention to bigger events or to activities with 
significant and tangible international implications. Conse-
quently, Brazil has lost to a certain extent its international 
credibility and prestige in foreign affairs.
Brazilian Foreign Policy and health
The analysis of the actors and projects here identified sug-
gest two ongoing processes taking place in the BFP in health: 
one in which the budget cuts or the BFP problems resulted 
in worse outcomes for health projects, and another, in which 
changes can be noticed, however the causality is yet unclear. 
Those are the cases of BRICS and Unasur, in which there has 
been a decline but bureaucratic inertia has avoided worse 
consequences to the outcomes of health matters.
Discontinuities and problems are clear in the cases of 
Oswaldo Cruz Foundation – Fiocruz (part of the Brazilian 
Ministry of Health) and the BCA (part of Itamaraty). The 
Ministry of Health, for example, acquired considerable 
participation in the country’s health-related international 
actions during Lula’s administration, and Fiocruz saw them 
increasing greatly during Lula’s two terms. This was part 
of a process Brazil underwent, which was defined by BFP 
experts as “foreign policy horizontalization”: several gov-
ernment agencies, not only the MOFA, were responsible for 
foreign policy decision-making. Former Minister of Health, 
José Gomes Temporão, stated in an interview that during 
his years in office (2007-2010), he engaged in internation-
al activities every “two months directly with Celso Amorim 
(Minister of Foreign Affairs under Lula),” who worked with 
him a Brazilian global health agenda (Temporão, 2014). 
Approximately 60% of all the departments in the Minis-
try of Health (MOH) were involved in international affairs 
(Badin and França, 2010).
In 1998, the MOH established the Office of Health 
International Affairs (AISA, acronym in Portuguese), 
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which is the main agency of the MOH working on foreign 
health policy. Due to its extensive experience in interna-
tional negotiations, the MOH delegated new tasks to the 
AISA: they signed with the Pan American Health Organi-
zation (PAHO) a 10-year-long Cooperation Agreement 
(2009-2019), so that the office could contribute to projects 
involving Unasur, the Caribbean, CPLP, and African coun-
tries. PAHO emphasizes, in a report, this Agreement is still 
under execution, and its main goal is to strengthen AISA 
“in consonance with national health strategies and the BFP” 
(PAHO, 2014, p. 205). Until the first semester of 2014, the 
MOH had received US$ 12.644.999,21 to accomplish this 
task (PAHO, 2014, p. 218). However, in recent years, the 
MOH has been trying to increase the management of for-
eign policy projects, and AISA did not innovate its action or 
programs concerning BFP.
Several changes took place in Fiocruz, a division of the 
MOH that focuses on research, education, and technical 
cooperation. While Fiocruz did not observe a decline in 
research funding, the absence of available data for inter-
national cooperation suggests funding problems for these 
activities since 2008 (Senado Federal, 2003-2014). However, 
the reports of Fiocruz official activities for the period of 
2011-2014 mention that most international activities were 
continued or consolidated (Fiocruz, 2013, 2014, 2015).
One of the main Brazilian projects in health under the 
responsibility of Fiocruz was the establishment of a Mozam-
bican laboratory for the production of antiretroviral medi-
cine. With an investment of R$ 40 million for the period 
of 2008-2014, the Mozambican Medicines Society (Socie-
dade Moçambicana de Medicamentos – SMM) would be 
the first 100% public laboratory in Africa and an example 
of what a structuring cooperation in health would really 
mean (Ventura, 2013). The project, as stated by Amorim 
(2013, p. 148), came at the request of the Mozambican gov-
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ernment, and the cooperation agreement for the establish-
ment of such industry was signed by the two countries in 
2003, during the first of three visits that Lula would make 
to the African country (MOFA, 2011; Ventura, 2013; Milani 
and Lopes, 2014).
In November 2012, the first locally produced antire- 
troviral was delivered to the Mozambican MOH (Fiocruz, 
2013a), however many problems happened along the way, 
from plant’s building to managerial issues (Milani and 
Lopes, 2014). President Lula was personally committed and 
took the lead when problems emerged, acquiring financial 
support from the Brazilian company “Vale” to ensure the 
construction of the plant, at the same time visiting Mozam-
bique to “speed up the understandings” (Milani and Lopes, 
2014, p. 71). Lula returned to the country, now as a for-
mer president, to personally follow the delivery of the first 
batch of drugs. Dilma had officially visited Mozambique in 
2011 to hold meetings with local investors – highlighting 
then the exploration of mineral coal, investments in energy, 
ports, and airports infrastructure etc. and from the Brazil-
ian Development Bank (BNDES, acronym in Portuguese) 
(Presidential Office, 2011; Milani and Lopes, 2014).
In July 2012, the Brazilian government wanted to take 
advantage of Dilma’s presence in Mozambique for the IX 
Conference of Chiefs of State and Government of CPLP to 
officially open the industry. However, not only the Mozam-
bican government did not want to inaugurate the factory, 
justifying this on the grounds that there had not been any 
production of medicine, but Dilma also did not go to Mapu-
to to examine the situation; instead, Vice-President Michel 
Temer and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Patriota went in 
her place. Such fact implied she was not committed to the 
entire enterprise (MOFA, 2012; Milani and Lopes, 2014).
The Brazilian government was particularly worried when 
the Institute for Management of Companies and State Par-
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ticipation (IGEPE, acronym in Portuguese), a Mozambican 
government organ specialized in public-private partner-
ships, took control over the industry; there were even rumors 
about a possible privatization process to sell SMM (Milani 
and Lopes, 2014). Nevertheless, IGEPE had been in charge 
alongside the MOH from Mozambique for the implemen-
tation, oversight, and evaluation of the Cooperation Agree-
ment since 2011. In the same year, not only the industry of 
medicines received the name of Mozambican Medicines 
Society, but IGEPE was declared to be the owner of SMM 
(but the Mozambican Ministry of Health still participates in 
the SMM administration by appointing the direction of its 
administrative council as well of its executive director) (Brasil 
and Moçambique, 2011; Russo et al., 2014).
According to Russo et al. (2014), Brazil was not complete-
ly aware of how complicated the implementation of a coop-
eration project in a country with different social, political, and 
historical background would be. While the Brazilian MOH is 
responsible for the production and surveillance of medicines 
sold within the country, in Mozambique, the MOH only super-
vises IGEPE’s work and will only oversee the project’s follow-
-up after 2017 – period when the Brazilian relationship with 
implementation efforts and training for the human resources 
for SMM is supposed to be finished in the African country.
Discontinuities and problems are much easier to under-
stand when examining the case of the MOFA. It had sig-
nificant cuts to its budget during Dilma’s first term: even 
resources used directly by this Ministry for international 
cooperation, as described in the national budget, were 
reduced. In 2005, BRL 430.705.861 were implement-
ed as international cooperation; in 2011, this amount 
was decreased to BRL 82.188.671 and, in 2012, to BRL 
63.002.107. As seen, until 2008, the amount due to inter-
national cooperation was considerably higher (Brasil, 2013, 
2015a; Senado Federal, 2015).
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Furthermore, if we consider the federal budget for 
the BCA, there was a noteworthy decrease of the avail-
able resources. While during Lula’s years, the BCA had its 
budget revised and increased, in Dilma’s, this trend was 
reversed. In 2010, the BCA had, for South-South Coopera-
tion with Africa alone, US$ 20 million available. Two years 
later, there was only US$ 9.9 million available (Hirst, 2012; 
Abdenur et al., 2014).
The trilateral cooperation among Brazil – Japan – Angola 
illustrates the impact this budget cut. Since 2009, Brazil and 
Japan had been working together in a partnership that would 
become, in 2011, a trilateral cooperation project for strength-
ening the Angolan health system (BCA, 2015). Focused on 
the Primary Health Care and on the development of human 
resources of two Angolan hospitals, this project, known after-
wards as ‘Proforsa’, implicated the Brazilian Agency of Inter-
national Cooperation (ABC, acronym in Portuguese), Fiocruz, 
the Universidade Estadual de Campinas, the Japanese Interna-
tional Cooperation Agency (JICA), and the Angolan Ministry 
of Health (MINSA) (Fiocruz, 2013c; BCA, 2015). Concluding 
in 2014, Proforsa was the most recognized cooperation proj-
ect between Angola and Brazil; however, it suffered greatly on 
its third year of implementation due to the ABC budget cuts. 
The project only continued because JICA and MINSA paid for 
what ABC could no longer contribute to (Fonseca, Esteves and 
Gomes, 2015).
As mentioned, there were other agencies that saw their 
BFP activities gradually weaken, though these outcomes 
during Dilma’s administration are difficult to measure. 
For instance, the CPLP and Unasur were both considered 
important agencies and examples of Brazil’s international 
cooperation for health. A Strategic Plan for Cooperation in 
Health was developed under the scope of CPLP, and was 
supposed to last from 2009 to 2012. With a modest budget 
of 14 million Euros, the plan established seven strategic 
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axes of action and emphasized the development of human 
resources for health in CPLP countries (Ventura, 2013).
In April 2013, a technical meeting to assess the Strategic 
Plan 2009 – 2012 took place in Lisbon, Portugal. The assess-
ment report combines the implementation evaluation of 
the established goals and new ideas for upcoming projects. 
Such document emphasizes that only two projects had an 
“acceptable degree of implementation” (CPLP, 2013, p. 5): 
a project to boost networks of structuring institutions and 
the creation of a Centre of Specialized Medical Training in 
Cape Verde. It also states that some projects were not devel-
oped or were only partially developed, and that networks 
for malaria and HIV/Aids were not operational. Despite all 
problems, the Plan was considered important and will last 
until late 2016 (CPLP, 2013).
Additionally, the report states that governance tools of 
such Plan need to be improved because there are flaws in 
dialogue and leadership, as well as inadequate follow-up 
in the implementation of projects. The domestic political 
issues of countries changed national strategies and had neg-
ative consequences to the management and development 
of projects (CPLP, 2013).
From the year 2008 to 2009, Brazil decreased its contri-
bution to CPLP; however, the MOFA was no longer respon-
sible for these funds: the Ministry of Planning, Budget and 
Management became in charge of them (Senado Federal, 
2003-2014). One question should be highlighted: Dilma’s 
term started in 2011, and documents mark that this change 
happened in the middle of Lula’s second term. Therefore, 
the decrease of MOFA’s autonomy cannot be associated 
with Dilma’s considerations for the BFP.
A negative shift in the BFP under Dilma’s administra-
tion can be noticed in her government’s work with other 
nations from BRICS. Brazil has been taking part in the 
BRICS Chiefs of State and Government Annual Summits 
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since 2009, although the country’s recent participation 
has become lackluster, leaving room for China and Rus-
sia’s growing influence (Ventura, 2013; Cervo and Lessa, 
2014). The BRICS’ Ministers of Health Meetings started on 
July 2011. During a meeting that took place in Brasília, on 
December 2014, the Ministers demonstrated that the main 
emphasis of the group was still access to medicines and the 
fight against HIV/Aids, hepatitis C, tuberculosis and other 
illnesses that are public health threats to the nations from 
BRICS. In the recent IV Meeting of Ministers of Health for 
the BRICS, they also agreed to develop a cooperation plan 
to combat tuberculosis, with an emphasis on guarantee-
ing the share of technology and on providing tuberculosis 
drugs for all in need. The deadline for the development of 
an operational framework for this plan was the first semes-
ter of 2015 (BRICS, 2014).
Tuberculosis is an important issue for BRICS, since 
it represents 50% of all cases of this disease in the world 
(BRICS Policy Center, 2014). However, the implementation 
of the projects has been running slowly: in the beginning of 
2013, the world already knew that BRICS were debating how 
to combat more resistant types of tuberculosis, and that a 
plan of action was expected for 2014 (Fiocruz, 2013b). While 
recently the issue of tuberculosis was discussed with interest 
in a wider scope of action, there still seems to be within the 
group a protraction in the decision-making process, as well as 
in the development of future projects. The Brazilian Minister 
of Health, Arthur Chioro, said that the group would propose 
the creation of a fund to face the issue, but did not specify 
which responsibilities Brazil would take or how the country 
would participate (BRICS Policy Center, 2014). This suggests 
once again that Dilma’s administration did not prioritize 
increasing Brazil’s leadership role in this group.
Health is a key topic to the Unasur, and, in this case, 
Brazil’s recent domestic constraints had a negative impact 
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too. Health is considered a “funding pillar of the [South 
American] continent,” and for the last five years, Unasur 
member-States have participated in the World Health 
Assembly (WHA) as Unasur (ISAGS, 2015a, p. 1). Besides 
developing ten common proposals about different topics 
to be presented at this WHA meeting (some of them con-
cerning the post-2015 development agenda), and recalling 
the importance of the impact of quality of food intake to 
diseases like obesity and malnutrition at the 68th WHA, 
Unasur went further. In 2014, the Union got involved with 
the South-American and Arabian Countries Summit – ASPA 
Summit), introducing in April of that year the Lima Decla-
ration. This was signed up by all ministers of health from 
all the implicated States, and it described common prob-
lems and pursue for health systems strengthening (Fiocruz, 
2014; ISAGS, 2015b).
Likewise, Unasur had a meeting with the CPLP on May 
2014. Both international organisms emphasize the strength 
of structuring networks and the knowledge propagation, 
thus they combined their efforts to develop a Joint Net-
working Department for the National Institutes of Health 
or Public Health, bringing together institutes from both 
geographic parts of the world (South America and Africa 
as RINS/Unasur and RINSP/CPLP). The goal of this net-
work was to understand how inequities in health are socially 
determined, and to formulate a joint proposal to solve com-
mon problems (CPLP, 2014).
Most of Unasur efforts count on ISAGS (Instituto Sul-
Americano de Governo em Saúde, in Portuguese) support. 
However, although the Institute was created in 2011, it was 
only as recently as June 1st 2015 that the Brazilian Chamber 
of Deputies approved the document “Headquarters Agree-
ment Between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the 
Union of South American Nations for the Establishment 
of the South American Institute of Government in Health.” 
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Worse still, this document still needs the approval of the 
Federal Senate, so that ISAGS becomes a regular institution 
in the country (Brasil, 2015b).
With respect to the recent efforts to reform the WHO, 
Brazil has nevertheless remained committed to its actions and 
involvement. For several years, the country has been pressing 
for several changes in multilateral institutions. As to the WHO, 
Brazil has been very critical for the lack of priority and atten-
tion paid to health and development in the official documents 
(Ventura, 2013). During international negotiations over the 
WHO’s 2014 budget, Brazil agreed to increase its contribution 
to the WHO, claiming that it would also increase the pressure 
for a more open position from such institution to developing 
countries requests. Russia, India, and China also accepted to 
increase their contributions (Chade, 2013).
Unasur, with the support of Brazil, also asked for a wide 
reform at the WHO in 2012, highlighting that not only the 
international organization financing should be revised, but 
also the emphasis given to social determinants of health 
(ISAGS, 2012). Even domestic organs, such as AISA, fol-
lowed the negotiations and coordinated actions connected 
to the reform process (PAHO, 2014).
Regarding the WHO actions against Ebola and this dis-
ease outbreak, Brazil donated BRL 25 million to the UN, 
and of this amount, 50% were sent to the WHO, 26% to the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 18% to the World 
Food Program, and 6% to the UN Mission for Ebola Emer-
gency Response (UNMEER) (MOFA and MOH, 2014). The 
country has also submitted what it understands as “kits”, i.e. 
basic material needed for health care (as gloves) with medi-
cines that would help 500 people for three months. They 
were sent to Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the WHO 
(MOFA and MOH, 2014).
When compared to other BRICS nations, such as Chi-
na, Brazil’s efforts were weaker. China not only donated 
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US$ 32,540 million for humanitarian aid, but also sent US$ 
5 million in health care material and 115 specialists in com-
municable diseases to the most affected countries (Taylor, 
2015). This comparison suggests that perhaps Brazil could 
have contributed more to the Ebola outbreak.
Light should be shed on Brazil’s position regarding the 
debates about global health and security. In the UN secu-
rity council sessions about Ebola crisis, Brazil emphasized 
that the emergency should be interpreted with a social 
point of view. Ambassador Guilherme Patriota’s speech on 
the 7268th UN security council meeting claimed that Brazil 
welcomed the creation of the UN Mission for Ebola Emer-
gency Response. However, the diplomat stressed that Bra-
zil “underline[s] the need to treat the outbreak first and 
foremost as a health emergency and a social and develop-
ment challenge rather than a threat to peace and security” 
(UNSC, 2014, p. 28).
***
During Lula’s years, expressions as “structuring coopera-
tion,” “active and proud foreign policy,” were quite common 
in debates on the BFP in health. Health gradually became an 
important BFP topic, though Lula’s era was not exempt of crit-
icism, especially because at times there is a “distance between 
the grandiloquence of intentions and the materialization of 
the act” (Buss and Ferreira apud Ventura, 2013, p. 106).
The downfall of Brazil’s international insertion, as identi-
fied by Cervo and Lessa (2014) and discussed in this article, 
had an impact on Brazilian strategies in global health. Prob-
lems in the administration of international projects already 
existed during Lula’s years, and there was a debate back then 
requiring a better understanding of those actors involved in 
the international health cooperation – to avoid problems as the 
ones that happened with the SMM project in Mozambique –, 
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and for better coordination among all different agencies and 
organisms that took part in this process. Nonetheless, there 
was a personal commitment from former President Lula to 
deal with these management problems, and the same could 
not be verified in Dilma’s first term, in which financial restric-
tions and budgetary cuts, as happened to ABC in Angola, had 
an even stronger negative impact in some projects. The MOFA 
and Fiocruz struggled as well with some changes.
The absence of new expressions and concepts in the 
BFP could be an indicator that Lula’s strategies have con-
tinued under Dilma’s administration. However, the lack of 
resources and the absence of Dilma’s efforts to prioritize 
BFP and establish new international priorities suggest the 
opposite situation. For instance, the project with Mozam-
bique waned under Dilma, while evidence show that Unasur, 
BRICS and CPLP actions in the health field continued due 
to the effort of individual actors and bureaucratic inertia, 
instead of proactive efforts from Dilma’s administration. In 
most of these cases, there has been a sluggish continuity in 
BFP, while Dilma has not made an effort to make projects 
work better or to speed up the processes.
Eduardo Gómez
is senior lecturer in international development at King’s 
College London International Development Institute.
Fernanda Aguilar Perez
is a joint PhD candidate from University of São Paulo/
King’s College London, with a Fapesp/Capes scholarship, 
from São Paulo Research Foundation.
References
ABDENUR, A. E. et al. 2014. Brazilian health and agricultural cooperation 
in Mozambique: an overview. BPC Papers, v. 2, n. 5, pp. 1-28.
AMORIM, C. 2013. Breves narrativas diplomáticas. São Paulo: Benvirá.
192
Lua Nova, São Paulo, 98: 171-197, 2016
Brazilian foreign policy in health during Dilma Rousseff’s administration
BADIN, M. R.; FRANÇA, C. 2010. A inserção internacional do Poder 
Executivo federal brasileiro. Análises e Propostas, São Paulo, n. 40, pp. 1-34.
BCA – Brazilian Cooperation Agency. 2015. Projeto PROFORSA. Available 
at: <http://www.abc.gov.br/imprensa/mostrarnoticia/534>. Accessed 
on: June 10, 2015.
BLISS, K. 2011. Health diplomacy of foreign governments. Washington, DC: 
Center for Strategic and International Studies.
BRASIL. 2013. National Budget 2013. Available at: <http://www.
orcamentofederal.gov.br/orcamentos-anuais/orcamento-2013-1/loa/
VolumeIV.pdf>. Accessed on: June 1, 2015.
______. Câmara dos Deputados [The Chamber of Deputies]. 2015a. 
Atividade legislativa, orçamento e LOA. Vol. IV.
______. Câmara dos Deputados [The Chamber of Deputies]. 2015b. 
Aprova o texto do Acordo de Sede entre a República Federativa 
do Brasil e a União de Nações Sul-Americanas (Unasul) para o 
funcionamento do Instituto Sul-Americano de Governo em Saúde 
(ISAGS). Item 21: PDC 24/2015.
BRASIL; MOÇAMBIQUE. 2011. Ajuste complementar ao acordo geral de 
cooperação entre o Governo da República Federativa do Brasil e o Governo 
da República de Moçambique para o projeto de instalação da fábrica 
de antirretrovirais e outros medicamentos em Moçambique. Maputo, 
Moçambique.
BRICS. 2014. IV Meeting of the Ministers of Health of the BRICS: Joint 
Communiqué. Available at: <http://u.saude.gov.br/images/pdf/2014/
dezembro/17/Joint-Communiqu---FINAL---ENGLISH-05.12.14.pdf>. 
Accessed on: June 9, 2015.
BRICS Policy Center. 2014. This week in BRICS, v. 2, n. 65.
BUSS, P.; FERREIRA, J. R. 2011. Cooperação e integração regional em 
saúde na América do Sul: a contribuição da Unasul-Saúde. Ciência & 
Saúde Coletiva, v. 16, n. 6, pp. 2699-711.
CERVO, A. L. 2010. Brazil’s rise on the international scene: Brazil and the 
world. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, v. 53, Special Edition, 
pp. 7-32.
CERVO, A. L.; LESSA, A. C. 2014. O declínio: inserção internacional do 
Brasil (2011-2014). Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, v. 57, n. 2, 
pp. 133-51.
CHADE, J. 2013. Brasil vai dobrar contribuição para a OMS em 2014. O 
Estado de S. Paulo. Available at: <http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/
vidae,brasil-vai-dobrar-contribuicao-para-a-oms-em-2014,1034996,0.
htm>. Accessed on: October 17, 2013.
193
Fernanda Aguilar Perez
Lua Nova, São Paulo, 98: 171-197, 2016
CHAN, L.; CHEN, L.; XU, J. 2010. China’s engagement with global health 
diplomacy: was SARS a watershed? PLOS Medicine, v. 7, n. 4, e1000266.
COWLEY, M. 2014. Cuba to raise pay of doctors working in Brazil. The 
Wall Street Journal. Available at: <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000
1424052702304709904579411591801968068>. Accessed on: October 
10, 2015.
CPLP – Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa. 2013. Reunião 
técnica de avaliação do PECS – 2009-2012. Available at: <http://www.
cplp.org/Files/Billeder/cSaude/Relatrio-Aval-PECS-2009-2012_FINAL.
pdf>. Accessed on: June 09, 2015.
FELDMAN, H.; MICHAUD, J. 2010. Health diplomacy and the enduring 
relevance of foreign policy interests. PLOS Medicine, v. 7, n. 4, e1000226.
FIGUEIREDO, A. C.; LIMONGI, F. 2000. Presidential power, legislative 
organization, and party behavior in Brazil. Comparative Politics, v. 32, n. 
2, pp. 151-70.
FIOCRUZ – Fundação Oswaldo Cruz. 2013a. CRIS INFORMA #4. Rio de 
Janeiro: Fiocruz. Available at: <https://portal.fiocruz.br/sites/portal.
fiocruz.br/files/documentos/Cris%20Informa%204_0.pdf>. Accessed 
on: March 15, 2016.
______. 2013b. CRIS INFORMA #5. Rio de Janeiro: Fiocruz. Available at: 
<https://portal.fiocruz.br/sites/portal.fiocruz.br/files/documentos/
Cris%20Informa%205%20-%20JAN-FEV2013_0.pdf>. Accessed on: 
March 15, 2016.
______. 2013c. CRIS INFORMA #10. Rio de Janeiro: Fiocruz. Available at: 
<https://portal.fiocruz.br/sites/portal.fiocruz.br/files/documentos/
Cris%20Informa%2010.pdf>. Accessed on: March 15, 2016.
______. 2013d. Relatório de gestão do exercício de 2012. Rio de Janeiro: 
Fiocruz.
______. 2014. CRIS INFORMA #12. Rio de Janeiro. Available at: <https://
portal.fiocruz.br/sites/portal.fiocruz.br/files/documentos/cris_
informa_12_final_2.pdf>. Accessed on: March 15, 2016.
______. 2015. Relatório de gestão do exercício de 2013. Rio de Janeiro.
FONSECA, J. M.; ESTEVES, P.; GOMES, G. Z. 2015. Brazilian health and 
agricultural cooperation in Angola: an overview. BPC Papers, v. 3, n. 2, 
pp. 1-38.
GÓMEZ, E. J. 2012. Understanding Brazilian global health diplomacy: 
social health movements, institutional infiltration, and the geopolitics 
of accessing information. Global Health Governance, v. 6, n. 1, pp. 1-29.
HERMANN, B. 2011. Soberania, não intervenção e não indiferença: reflexões 
sobre o discurso diplomático brasileiro. Brasília: Funag.
194
Lua Nova, São Paulo, 98: 171-197, 2016
Brazilian foreign policy in health during Dilma Rousseff’s administration
HIRST, M. 2012. Aspectos conceituais e práticos da atuação do Brasil em 
Cooperação Sul-Sul: os casos de Haiti, Bolívia e Guiné Bissau. Rio de 
Janeiro/Brasília: Ipea (Texto para Discussão, n.1.687).
HUANG, Y. 2010. Pursuing health as a foreign policy: the case of China. 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, v. 17, n. 1, pp. 105-46.
______. 2011. Domestic factor’s in China’s health aid programs in Africa. 
In: FREEMAN, C. (ed.). China’s emerging global health and foreign 
aid engagement in Africa. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies.
HUDSON, V. M. 2014. Foreign policy analysis. Maryland: Rowman & 
Littlefield.
ISAGS – Instituto Sul-Americano de Governo em Saúde. 2012. ISAGS 
Report. Available at: <http://www.isags-unasur.org/uploads/eventos/
ev[47]ling[3]anx[46].pdf>. Accessed on: June 7, 2016.
_______. 2015a. Informe ISAGS. Rio de Janeiro. Available at: <http://www.
isags-unasur.org/uploads/eventos/ev[3037]ling[1]anx[497].pdf>. 
Accessed on: June 8, 2015.
_______. 2015b. Informe anual 2014. Available at: <http://www.isags-
unasur.org/uploads/biblioteca/7/bb[317]ling[1]anx[1064].pdf>. 
Accessed on: June 8, 2015.
KICKBUSCH, I. et al. 2013. Global health diplomacy: concepts, issues, actors, 
instruments, fora, and cases. New York: Springer Press.
LABONTE, R.; GAGNON, M. 2010. Framing health and foreign policy: 
lessons for global health diplomacy. Globalization & Health, v. 6, n. 14, pp. 
1-19.
LAFER, C. 2000. Brasil: dilemas e desafios da política externa. Estudos 
Avançados, v. 14, n. 38, pp. 260-67.
LEE, K.; GÓMEZ, E. J. 2011. Brazil’s ascendance: the soft power role of 
global health diplomacy. European Business Review, pp. 61-64. Available 
at: <https://www.aber.ac.uk/en/media/departmental/interpol/chair/
KL---Brazil’s-ascendance-article.pdf>. Accessed on: February 15, 2016.
LEE, K.; SMITH, R. 2011. What “is” global health diplomacy: a conceptual 
review. Global Health Governance, v. 5, n. 1, pp. 1-12.
LEITE, P. S. 2011. O Brasil e a operação Sul-Sul em três momentos: os governos 
Jânio Quadros/João Goulart, Ernesto Geizel e Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. 
Brasília: Funag.
MAINWARING, S. 1997. Multipartism, robust federalism and 
presidentialism in Brazil. In: MAINWARING, S.; SHUGART, M. S. 




Lua Nova, São Paulo, 98: 171-197, 2016
MICHAUD, J.; KATES, J. 2012. Raising the profile of diplomacy in the 
U.S. global health response: a backgrounder on global health diplomacy. 
Washington, DC: Kaiser Family Foundation.
______. 2013. Global health diplomacy: advancing foreign policy and global 
health interests. Global Health: Science and Practice, v. 1, n. 1, pp. 24-8.
MILANI, C.; LOPES, R. 2014. Cooperação Sul-Sul e policy transfer em saúde 
pública: análise das relações entre Brasil e Moçambique entre 2003 e 
2012. Carta Internacional, v. 9, n. 1, pp. 59-78.
MOFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2011. Relatório de visitas internacionais 
do Presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva e de visitas ao Brasil de Chefes de 
Estado e de Chefes de Governo entre janeiro de 2003 e dezembro de 2010. 
Brasília, DF.
______. 2012. Visita a Moçambique do Vice-Presidente da República, Michel 
Temer e do Ministro das Relações Exteriores, Antonio de Aguiar Patriota – 18 a 
20 de julho de 2012. Brasília, DF.
MOFA and MOH – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Health. 
2014. Nota à imprensa conjunta dos Ministérios das Relações Exteriores e da 
Saúde – contribuição brasileira ao combate internacional ao vírus do Ebola. 
Brasília, DF. 
NYE, J. 2004. Soft power: the means to success in world politics. New York: 
Public Affairs Press.
NOVOTNY, T.; KICKBUSCH, I.; TOLD, M. (eds.). 2013. 21st century global 
health diplomacy. Singapore: World Scientific Press.
PAHO – PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION. 2014. Relatório 
de gestão dos termos de cooperação primeiro semestre de 2014. Brasília, 
DF. Available at: <http://www.paho.org/bra/images/stories/
Documentos2/rel__de_gestao_1_sem_2014.pdf>. Accessed on: June 
10, 2015.
PINHEIRO, L.; MILANI, C. 2012. Introdução. In: ______. Política externa 
brasileira – as práticas da política e a política das práticas. Rio de Janeiro: FGV.
PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE. 2011. Nota oficial – MRE divulga nota informativa 
sobre a visita da presidenta Dilma Rousseff a Maputo – Moçambique. Brasília, DF.
RUSSO, G. et al. 2014. On the margins of aid orthodoxy: the Brazil-
Mozambique collaboration to produce essential medicines in Africa. 
Globalization and Health, v. 10, n. 70.
SENADO FEDERAL [Federal Senate]. 2003-2014. Brazilian federal budget. 
All years available at: <http://www12.senado.gov.br/orcamento/
documentos/loa>. Accessed on: March 17, 2016.
______. 2015. Detalhamento das ações de órgãos do poder executivo: 35000 – 
Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Brasília, DF.
196
Lua Nova, São Paulo, 98: 171-197, 2016
Brazilian foreign policy in health during Dilma Rousseff’s administration
TAYLOR, I. 2015. China’s response to the Ebola virus disease in West 
Africa. The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 
v. 104, n. 1, pp. 41-54.
TEMPORÃO, J. G. 2014. [José Gomes Temporão:] Interview to Deisy de 
Freitas Lima Ventura. Rio de Janeiro.
THOMPSON, D. 2005. China’s soft power in Africa: from the “Beijing 
consensus” to health diplomacy. China Brief: A Journal of Analysis and 
Information, v. 5, n. 21.
TWIGG, J. 2012. Russia’s emerging global health leadership. Washington, D.C.: 
Center for Strategic and International Studies.
UNSC – United Nations Security Council. 2014. Agenda peace and security 
in Africa. 7268th meeting. Thursday, 18 September 2014. New York S/
PV.7268.
VENTURA, D. 2013. Saúde pública e política externa brasileira. SUR – 
Revista Internacional de Direitos Humanos, v. 10, n. 19, pp. 99-117.
VENTURA, D.; PEREZ, F. A. 2015. A política externa de saúde de Dilma 
Rousseff (2011-2014): elementos preliminares para um balanço. 5º 
Encontro Nacional da ABRI, Belo Horizonte, 29-31 July.
VIGEVANI, T.; CEPALUNI, G. 2007. A política externa de Lula da Silva: a 
estratégia da autonomia pela diversificação. Contexto Internacional, v. 29, 
n. 2, pp. 273-335.
WATT, N.; GÓMEZ, E. J.; McKEE, M. 2013. Global health in foreign policy 
– and foreign policy in health? Evidence from the BRICS. Health Policy 
& Planning, v. 29, n. 6, pp. 763-73.
WERLAU, M. 2013. Cuba’s healthcare diplomacy: the business 
of humanitarianism. World Affairs. Available at: <http://www.
worldaffairsjournal.org/article/cuba’s-health-care-diplomacy-business-
humanitarianism>. Accessed on: February 20, 2016.
197
Fernanda Aguilar Perez
Lua Nova, São Paulo, 98: 171-197, 2016




Abstract: This article analyses changes and continuities in 
Brazilian international actions in the field of public health, 
aiming at understanding how the Brazilian foreign policy in 
health during President Dilma Rousseff’s first term (2011-2014) 
was developed. Available data from President Luiz Inácio Lula 
da Silva (2003-2010) years and Dilma’s first term were used 
for comparative purposes. Emphasis was given on South-South 
cooperation projects, more specifically the Union of South American 
Countries (USAN, Unión de Naciones Suramericanas – Unasur) 
and to the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP). 
Brazilian behavior in international fora, such as the World 
Health Organization, was analyzed as well, with the purpose of 
understanding how such behavior evolved. In addition, domestic 
issues were considered. In this case, the coordination among 
different actors of the Brazilian Executive Power received due 
attention. Findings suggest that there has been downfall and even 
decline in the Government’s foreign health policy.
Keywords: Foreign Policy; Global Health; Cooperation.
A POLÍTICA EXTERNA BRASILEIRA EM SAÚDE DURANTE  
O GOVERNO DE DILMA ROUSSEFF (2011-2014)
Resumo: Este artigo analisa mudanças e continuidades nas ações 
internacionais do Brasil no campo da saúde pública, buscan-
do compreender o desenvolvimento da política externa bra-
sileira em saúde durante o primeiro mandato da Presidente 
Dilma Rousseff (2011-2014). Dados relativos à presidência de 
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) e do primeiro mandato 
de Dilma foram usados para fins de comparação. Projetos da 
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Cooperação Sul-Sul receberam ênfase, mais especificamente 
os da União das Nações Sul-Americanas (Unasul, Unión de 
Naciones Suramericanas – Unasur) e da Comunidade dos 
Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP). O comportamento do 
Brasil em órgãos internacionais, como a Organização Mundial 
de Saúde (OMS), também foi analisado, com o propósito de 
compreender como tal comportamento evoluiu. Além disso, 
foram considerados os problemas internos. Neste caso, a coor-
denação entre diferentes atores do Poder Executivo brasileiro 
recebeu a devida atenção. Os resultados sugerem que houve 
uma retração ou até mesmo um declínio da política externa 
em saúde do país.
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